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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ectiveness of some commonly discussed anticorruption re-
forms on political corruption, using a theoretical model of competition between
two candidates in a probabilistic voting setup. Candidates, who may di¤er
both in their ability to produce the public good, and popularity with voters,
propose a tax rate and a public good level. The budget constraint implies that
taxes collected must equal the sum of funds used in public good production
plus funds stolen by the elected politician. We identify the conditions under
which constitutional constraints on policies, higher penalties for corruption,
and higher wages for elected politicians increase (or decrease) voterswelfare.
We discuss how the asymmetric information and the rigidity of constitutions
reduce the e¤ectiveness of the reforms, and how distributional e¤ects of re-
forms may reduce the voterssupport for a welfareimproving reform. Finally,
we argue that e¤ective reforms may not be proposed by both corrupt and
honest politicians.
JEL Codes: D72, H30, H83, K42.
Keywords: Political Agency, Constitutional Design, Economics of Reform
1 Introduction
According to Transparency Internationals 2005 Global Corruption Barome-
ter, GCB, a survey given to 55,000 people in low, medium and high income
countries, citizens in 45 (out of 69) countries considered political parties as
the institution most a¤ected by corruption. This is an increase from last year,
when it was 36 out of 62, (GCB 2005 p.3). For many voters political corruption
is not only common but also a most harmful problem, ..if citizens could wave
a magic wand to eliminate corruption from just one institution, more would
choose to clean up political parties than any other institution., GCB 2003. Of
course a politician as well as anyone else may decide to commit a corrupt act.
However, in a democracy any politician who wants to be reelected incorpo-
rates the e¤ect of his actions on his support from the electorate in subsequent
elections. Yet, given votersdislike of corruption and politiciansdesire for
reelection, it seems paradoxical that in many democracies political corruption
is widespread, and corrupt politicians win the elections repeatedly. In this pa-
per we analyze the e¤ectiveness of some commonly discussed anti-corruption
reforms and consider the potential di¢ culties with their implementation.
To model political corruption we use a generalized version of Polos (1998)
model of political agency. In that world, the voting decision is subject to
random, unpredictable swings (probabilistic voting). Candidates can be dif-
ferentiated from one another in terms of dimensions other than corruption,
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e.g., with respect to their ability to produce the public good or their popular-
ity. In the model, expected rent maximizing candidates propose scal policy
platforms, where the amount they steal from the public treasury is implicitly
dened by the di¤erence between revenues and public good costs. Candidates
thus choose the amount they steal along with the policy platforms they pro-
pose. A candidates incentives to steal will increase in his ability/popularity
advantage over his rival and in the extent of randomness in voter loyalties.
Polos analogy to the context of price competition between two rms helps
explain this point. Consider two rms that select price and quality of their re-
spective products, in a context where there is uncertainty about their relative
demands. Bertrand competition will then allow rms to price above cost and
select suboptimal qualities. Using the same analogy, anticorruption reforms
are rules to regulate the political marketplace. We identify the conditions
that characterize the equilibrium of the political competition game, and then
evaluate the e¤ect of (i) constitutional constraints on tax rates and public
good levels, and (ii) higher salaries for politicians or harsher punishment for
corruption, on an aggregate measure of voterswelfare.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) models the state as a monopoly and ana-
lyze the e¤ects of constitutional restrictions on its power to tax. One possible
restriction is a limit on tax rates, Brennan and Buchanan (1980, ch. 10). They
study the e¤ects of constraints under the assumption of a monopoly govern-
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ment for whom theft constitutes the sole source of rents. In our investigation,
however, we study the e¤ects of tax constraints in a setting with duopolistic
competition and multiple sources of rents. We nd that tax constraints are
e¤ective in the case where the competing candidates are ex ante identical, but
may be counterproductive when they are not. In their model votersincome
increases in public good level, and decreases in tax rate, i.e., the La¤er curve.
That assumption, combined with the monopoly power of the state, makes lim-
its work in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). In contrast, we assume exogenous
income levels, yet, we nd that political competition, by producing an e¤ect
similar to La¤er curve on a candidates expected rents, makes tax rate lim-
its e¤ective when identical candidates compete. For heterogenous candidates
we provide an example where in the equilibrium only the popular candidate
who is proposing lower taxes is stealing. Then, we show that, any tax limit
will reduce voterswelfare. We also show that when candidates are identical,
tax rate limits enforcing a small government is not the only welfare increasing
policy. A constitutional constraint on public good level that enforces a large
government is also welfare increasing. These two constraints can be considered
as price and quality regulations in a duopoly, and they are complimentary in
general.
A commonly proposed reform to reduce the illegal appropriation of public
funds is to increase the legal compensations of politicians or the penalties
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for corruption, e.g., as suggested by Becker and Stigler (1974). In the market
analogy, salary reform corresponds to a prize (nanced by consumers) given to
the rm with the highest sales. In that case, a rm has incentives to increase its
sales, which can be accomplished by proposing a better price-quality ratio, i.e.,
lowering the level of corruption. Increasing the wage is, however, costly, since
customers eventually nance the wage bill. We nd that when the candidates
are identical, and, there are no legal penalties for corruption, the benet of
wage increase (lower corruption) justies the cost. But in the presence of legal
penalties or when one candidate is not corrupt, this is not always the case.
When legal incentives are very strong (a high probability of getting caught
and resultant harsh penalties), a candidate will remain honest no matter what
the electoral incentives. When the legal incentives are weak, the political
competition game may have multiple (two) equilibria: either both candidates
stay honest or at least one steals. In terms of anticorruption e¤ects, one has
to be careful. Since the legal incentives reduce the expected rents from the
o¢ ce, a small increase in legal penalties can raise corruption and lower welfare.
In Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5, we show when a reform would be welfare
increasing. Yet, we argue that a welfare-increasing reform may still not be im-
plemented due to asymmetric information, the rigid structure of constitutions,
distributional e¤ects of the reform, and the lack of (both corrupt and honest)
politicianssupport. In order to calculate the appropriate reforms one requires
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information privately hold by candidates, such as how able, popular or honest
they are. More importantly since the reforms, such as constitutions, will have
long lasting e¤ects, information about both current and future candidates as
well as future voters is required. Even if the reformers are fully informed, the
rigidity of constitutions reduces the e¤ectiveness of the reforms when the world
is not static. The intuition is that then the same incentive scheme has to be
used for di¤erent agents, or for the same agents under di¤erent circumstances.
The distributional e¤ects of reforms aggravates the e¤ects of imperfect
information. Even when they all have the same e¤ect on aggregate welfare the
most of the burden of salary reform and constitutional constraints on public
good levels is borne primarily by the rich. On the other hand constitutional
constraints on tax rates benets the rich most. Since voters with di¤erent
incomes have di¤erent preferences on reforms, we have another agency problem
when electing representatives to design the reform.
Finally, we consider the incentives of politicians to support constitutional
constraints. When both candidates are corrupt, it is not surprising that they
would have no interest in proposing a reform that would eliminate some of
their rents. We argue that even an honest candidate may not want to support
such a reform if his opponent is corrupt, since it removes an important source
of his competitive advantage.
The incumbency model by Barro(1973) and Ferejohn (1986) and its ex-
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tensions and generalizations by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), Ad-
sera, Boix and Payne (2003), Przeworski (2003), Besley (2005) and Besley
and Smart (2003) has been helpful to understand political corruption. These
models focus on the incentives of incumbents to steal, given that voters have
incomplete information about the state of the world, and voters support the
incumbent whenever he achieves a minimum performance standard. The min-
imum performance standard is the (exogenous) expected utility from the chal-
lenger. Another approach is that of Caselli and Morelli (2004) who studied
what determines the honesty and quality of elected politicians. Unlike us,
they allow the quality to be determined endogenously. But in their model cor-
rupt politicians do extract as much rents as they possibly can, i.e., there is no
concern for reelection. In their model the large number of players reduces the
strategic incentives in rent extraction to zero. The approach that we generalize
in this paper, presented rst in Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and developed
in Polo (1998), di¤er from both of these approaches by modeling the strategic
interaction between candidates. As we discuss after Proposition 5, when both
candidates are corrupt, the strategic e¤ects of a reform is important as well.
Also the model we study considers citizens with di¤erent levels of incomes
and di¤erent preferences on policies, that allows one to consider the conict of
interest among the voters, as well as the conict of interest between the voters
and the politicians.
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In the model, candidates compete only once, yet they keep their election
promises. We consider this an approximation to a dynamic model with repu-
tation. The kind of political corruption that this model explains best happens
where a small number of political leaders compete with each other repeatedly
over a long horizon, rather than political competition under short term limits.
The corrupt leaders whose behavior we study are honest thieves: They do
keep their promises, because they have future elections to compete, and future
rents to gain. In turn, the voters know what to expect from the politicians,
and then decide accordingly. Another important assumption is barriers to en-
try into politics. That is also a feature of political life in countries described
above. The barriers may be set endogenously; corrupt politicians would do
everything they could to make sure that there are barriers to entry. Although
one can think the commitment assumption as too optimistic, and barriers to
entry as too pessimistic, they are not necessary for political corruption to
occur. Polo(1998) shows that if one removes both of the assumptions, i.e.,
assumes K candidates but no commitment, corruption still occurs, as voters
then expect the candidates to steal, and in turn candidates steal in the equilib-
rium. The intuition is that a candidates chance of reelection with probabilistic
voting is small when the number of candidates is large.
In summary, modelling it as an agency problem, our model contributes to
an understanding of persistence of corruption in democracies in a variety of
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ways. Political corruption may stem from factors that are beyond the control
of constitution designers, such as the voter loyalty and candidate heterogene-
ity. Many reforms commonly suggested may increase corruption under certain
conditions. It is especially di¢ cult to design an e¤ective reform when one
candidate is honest. Even when a reform could improve voter welfare, imple-
mentation requires information that reformers may not have. Di¤erent reforms
have di¤erent distributional e¤ects, so there is a conict of interest among vot-
ers. And even when there exists a welfare improving reform that is supported
by electorate, it may not be proposed by any of the politicians, corrupt or
honest, competing for public o¢ ce.
Section 2 presents the model and a result, Theorem 1, on the existence and
uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. In section 3, we study the e¤ectiveness of the
reforms. We discuss the di¢ culties with implementing the reforms in section
4, and conclude in Section 5. The proof of Theorem 1, comparative statics,
a fully solved example using quasilinear utility function, and a discussion
and generalization of results from the previous literature are provided in a
companion paper, Evrenk (2006). The Appendix provides the rest of the
proofs.
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2 The Model
The Economy: We consider a generalized version of Polo (1998). Let us imag-
ine a society where each voter i has income Yi; out of which he pays an income
tax at at rate t and consumes the rest. The income in society is distributed
over [Ymin; Ymax] with measure (Yi): The size of the population, N , and the
average income Y = 1
N
R
Yid(Yi) are both normalized to one.
Candidates: There are two political agents (candidates) competing in elec-
tions. Simultaneously each agent j 2 f1; 2g chooses a policy platform, i.e.,
promises a tax rate, tj; and a public good level, gj, which he implements after
winning the election. Both agents are expected rent maximizers, and run for
the same position, which we call the position of leader. The leader produces
the public good from the available public funds using a linear technology, that
depends on his (non-veriable) ability level, j. The available public funds
that can be used by the leader in the production of public good is equal to
collected tax revenues minus the salary of the leader, w, and an amount that
he chooses to steal, sj. Thus the public good delivered when candidate j is
the leader is
gj = j(tj   w   sj). (1)
When a candidate wins the election, he is going to get legal rents and will
9
have access illegal rents. In addition to salary, legal rents include ego rents,
. Following the corruption literature, we assume that there are leakages
or deadweight losses from illegal rents: when the leader diverts a dollar
from the public budget, a fraction 1   j will be wasted, so the leader will
appropriate only j < 1. This parameter also captures the ethics of the leader,
when he is honest j = 0. We assume that a corrupt candidate believes that
he will get caught and be punished with probability p > 0. Then, he will be
deprived of his position, thus loose the legal rents, both w and ; and will pay
a legal penalty c + vsj with c > 0, and v > 0: Thus, the expected rents that
candidate j receives conditional on being elected is
Rj(sj) = w +  + 1fsj>0g[jsj   p(vsj + c+ w + )]: (2)
We assume that if the agent can not win the election, then he receives his
outside option, normalized to zero.
Voters: Each voter i has preferences over his consumption of the private
good, ci = (1  t)Yi; and the public good, g. Her preferences over consumption
are represented by the utility function
U(ci; g) = I(ci) + H(g);
where I(:) andH(:) are two strictly increasing, C2; and concave functions from
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R+ to R with at least one of them being strictly concave. We assume that the
most preferred tax rate of a voter decreases in her income, cI 00(c)+I 0(c) > 0 for
c 2 [0; Ymax]. Unlike Polo (1998) we do not assume quasilinear preferences.
Because as he notes, when the marginal utility from private good consumption
is constant, the equilibrium public good levels are always optimal, the only
e¤ect of corruption is higher taxes.1 By considering strictly concave I(:), we
can study situations where political corruption leads underprovided public
goods. However, that relaxation of assumption comes with a cost: When
preferences are not quasilinear, to rule out an equilibrium platform with either
zero public good or hundred percent taxes, we assume that the marginal utility
of consumption converges to innity as the good consumed goes to zero, i.e.,
limc#0 I 0(c) = 1, or limg#0H 0(g) =1,
The voting is sincere but probabilistic. Formally, let
U ji = U(c
j
i ; gj) + (j   1)i: (3)
where cji = (1  tj)Yi. Voter i votes for agent j whenever U ji > Uki : If U ji = Uki ,
then each candidate receives the vote with equal chance. The term i =
 + 2 + i2 captures the nonpolicy issues that a¤ect the voting decision,
where  is the electorates average bias in favor of Candidate 2 which is known
ex ante. A positive (negative)  means Candidate 2 is more (less) popular.
1Symmetrically, when H(:) is linear, then the equilibrium tax rates will be rstbest.
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From the candidatespoint of view, the other terms in voter preferences, 2 and
i2; are independent random variables uniformly distributed on (respectively)
[ 1
2
; 1
2
] and [ 1
2
; 1
2
]: The rst term, 2; reects uncertainty about a correlated
preference shock, while the second term, i2; reects an idiosyncratic shock
on individual is preferences. Note that the voters care about the ethics of a
candidate only if it reduces their own consumption.
To measure the welfare e¤ects of the reforms, we use voters expected
(purely utilitarian) welfare, E[W]. After some manipulations it can be written
as
E[W] = E[Ui((1  t2)Yi; g2(t2; s2))] +  + 1
2
(1)
2: (4)
The policy platform, (t0j ; g
0
j ); which maximizes E[W] when adopted by can-
didate j will be referred as the rstbest policy platform for candidate j. It
is straightforward to show that the rst best involves no corruption, s0j =
t0j   w   1j g0j = 0; and that the rst best tax rate, t0j , maximizes the aver-
age utility of the electorate, E[Ui((1   tj)Yi; gj(tj))]. The optimality of zero
corruption is intuitive: Given the tax rate, less stealing means higher public
goods delivered. On the other hand the optimal tax rate depends on the social
welfare function.
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2.1 Equilibrium and The Agency Problem
It is straightforward to show that the probability that j wins the elections
when he competes with k is,
j =
1
2
+ [E[U(cji ; gj)  U(cki ; gk)] +Pj]; (5)
where Pj = 2(j  32) is the e¤ect of ex-ante popularity advantage of candidate
j and E[f ] =
R
fd. Agent j chooses (tj; gj) to maximize his expected rents,
j(tj; gj; tk; gk)Rj(gj; tj): Let (t

j ; g

j ); j = 1; 2 denote a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, PSNE.We say that there is an agency problem whenever (tj ; g

j ) 6=
(t0j ; g
0
j ) for at least one candidate.
Evrenk (2006) discusses the equilibrium of the political competition game
in detail. We show that each candidate selects his policy platform to maximize
average voter utility conditional on sj: Due to the assumptions that candidates
are rent-maximizing, that voters are equally well informed, and that there
are no special interest lobbies, in our model the agency problem exists, if at
all, in only one dimension, i.e., stealing. The equilibrium level of stealing is
determined by the marginal expected utility of stealing for candidate j,
Rj
@E[U(cji ; gj)]
@sj
+ (j   vp)j. (6)
If candidate j steals, then (6)=0 at some sj > 0. Note that (6) is equal to a
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weighted average of two marginal gains: (ii) the marginal disutility of voters
from corruption, weighted by a measure of aggregate uncertainty times the
rents of candidate j; Rj, and (ii) the marginal utility from a stolen dollar
conditional on being elected, weighted by the probability of winning election,
j. As we discuss in detail in the companion paper,
Theorem 1 The political competition game,
(i) has a unique PSNE when there is no law enforcement, p = 0;
(ii) has at most two PSNE when there is law enforcement.
We do not have closed form solutions for the equilibrium, which may or may
not involve corruption. In the following we consider the set of parameters that
give rise to an equilibrium with at least one politician stealing. Then, using the
rst order conditions, we study the e¤ectiveness of constitutional constraints
on policy space, and, the incentives to candidates, on agency problem.
3 E¤ectiveness of Reforms
3.1 Constitutional Constraints
Geo¤rey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980) discuss how an individual
member of society who decides behind a veil of ignorancewould like to im-
pose constraints on the political decision-making process or on the domain of
the political outcomes to maximize the expected utility of his future selves. An
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example would be the Proposition 13, approved by voters in California in 1978,
it restricts the tax on real property to 1 percent of market value. Although
they rst give an example of electoral competition where aggregate uncer-
tainty about the vote shares always lead to an equilibrium where both candi-
dates steal, in the whole book Brennan and Buchanan (1980) use a monopoly
(Leviathan) model of state. As Brennan (1998) noted the Leviathan model,
which is the exact opposite of the benevolent dictator, is analytically conve-
nient and familiar to the reader. So, it might be useful when the constitutional
constraints were rst discussed. However, we believe that the e¤ectiveness of
constraints on policy space in democracies should be studied using a model of
political competition. For that, let us rst consider the e¤ect of a constitution
with the provision that the tax rate can not exceed T .
Proposition 1 It is impossible to implement the rst best policy platform
through imposing only a tax rate constraint.
Proof. The rst order condition with respect to taxes in a Nash equilibrium
is
Rpj
@E[Ui((1 tj)Yi;j(tj w sj))]
@tj
  j = 0;
where j is a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier satisfying j(tj   T ) = 0: Suppose
that there exists a T that implements the rst best. Then in the equilibrium
j > 0; which implies that the public good level is too small, E[YiI 0(ci)] <
ajH
0(G). But, in a rst-best the expected marginal utility of electorate with
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respect to tax rate should equal zero. Contradiction.
Proposition 1 does not mean that a constitutional constraint on tax rate is
useless. It simply means that these constraints may provide a benet, yet they
have a cost as well. Our second question is about the secondbest: When does
a constitutional constraint increase voters welfare in a society with political
corruption?
3.1.1 Constitutional constraints when candidates are identical.
Tax Rate Limits: Let us consider two (ex-ante) identical candidates competing
with each other in a country with a constitutional constraint at T . Using
(6), the equilibrium level of corruption by each candidate, s(T ), is given by
 R(s(T ))[H 0(T  w  s(T ))] + 1
2
(  pv)  0, with equality if s(T ) > 0.
In the equilibrium with corruption, the marginal e¤ect of a tax rate limit on
the level of stealing can be calculated as,
ds(T )
dT
=
Rp(s(T ))H 00(g)
Rp(s(T ))H 00(g)]  (   pv)H 0 (g) for s
(T ) > 0;
where g = (T   w   s(T )): Note that whenever H(:) is a strictly concave
function, the derivative, ds
(T )
dT
; is strictly positive, hence reducing the tax limit
would reduce stealing. But also note that, the derivative is always less than
one: The decrease in corruption comes with a cost, a reduction in public good
level. So, the net e¤ect of tax rate constraints on voterswelfare is not clear
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and needs to be calculated. The e¤ect of an incremental change in T on
voterswelfare can be calculated as, @E[W]
@T
= H 0(g)(1  ds(T )
dT
) E[YiI 0((1 
T )Yi)]. Note that at unconstrained political equilibrium with identical corrupt
candidates, H 0(g) = E[YiI 0(Yi(1  t)]. Thus,
Proposition 2 Whenever marginal utility from public good is decreasing, (H(:)
is strictly concave), and the identical candidates are stealing in the equilibrium,
there always exists a constitutional constraint that enforces both candidates to
o¤er a tax rate that is (at least marginally) lower than t and that constraint
is both corruption reducing and welfare-improving.
The intuition is that, for a given level of corruption, the tax rate constraints
lower g, raising marginal utility of public good. This increases the voters
disutility from corruption in (6). Hence the marginal utility of stolen funds for
a candidate becomes negative at s. A candidate reduces the level he steals
because now the cost of stealing in terms of votes foregone is higher. The
di¤erence between Brennan and Buchanans analysis is not simply that we have
two candidates where they have one Leviathan. What derives their result is the
assumption that higher public good levels (higher taxes) increase (decrease)
the taxable income with the assumption of monopoly power of politician. Our
argument incorporates the e¤ect of political competition. In our model, the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to either public goods or tax rates is
zero, so there is no La¤er curve, yet limits increase voterswelfare. Although
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imperfect, the electoral competition is what derives our result and make limits
work.
Using a market analogy, constitutional constraints are just rules for regu-
lating the political market. What we have shown is that if we have an ex-ante
symmetric duopoly with a special demand in that market, a price cap would
increase consumer welfare. Then one wonders, since in our model each rm
chooses both its price and quality, what would be the e¤ect of a minimum qual-
ity regulation on voterswelfare? That is to ask, how voterswelfare would
change if we have a constitutional constraint that requires each candidate to
provide at least a minimum level of public good,2 G?
Public Good Limits: The analysis of public good limits is very similar to the
tax rate limits: The rst best can not be implemented using only a minimum
public good level constraint. Similarly, whenever the marginal utility from
private good is strictly decreasing, we have  1

< ds

dG
< 0. Thus to reduce
stealing we need higher levels of G, i.e., another solution to political corruption
may be a constitution that enforces a large government.
Proposition 3 Whenever marginal utility from private good is decreasing,
(I(:) is strictly concave), and the identical candidates steal in the equilibrium,
there always exists a constitutional constraint that enforces both candidates to
o¤er a public good level that is (at least marginally) higher than g and that
2A similar idea can be found in Inman (1985, p.750). In his discussion of limits imposed
by citizens on a bureaucratpolitician with monopoly power, Inman considers a contract
that allows the monopolist to choose the public good level only from a given interval.
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constraint is both corruption reducing and welfare-improving.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. The intuition is that the
public good limit increases the taxes, reducing after tax income, and increasing
the marginal utility of private good consumption for a voter. That, in return
increases a voters disutility from corruption, and makes it more costly for a
candidate.
We have seen that when candidates are identical, under certain conditions
both constraints are welfare increasing. Which type of regulation is better for
voters? It is not di¢ cult to see that if candidates have the same ability using
both of the constraints, the rstbest can be implemented, simply setting T =
to, and G = go would maximize the voterswelfare. Also note that in that case
there is no need for law enforcement or any salary, as the constitution already
implements the rstbest, at no cost. This strong result heavily depends on
the assumptions of symmetric and static environment, a fully informed and
benevolent constitutional assembly, and the assumption that the produced
public good levels are veriable. In the next section we remove symmetry. We
discuss the e¤ect of other assumptions in section 4.
3.1.2 Constitutional constraints when candidates are not identical
So far we have discussed identical candidates, but what if the candidates are
not identical? Whenever two candidates propose di¤erent tax rates in the equi-
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librium, the one who proposes the higher tax rate, say Candidate 2, can be
targeted by a constitutional limit on tax rates. When Candidate 2 is proposing
higher taxes because he is corrupt, and Candidate 1 is proposing lower taxes,
because he is honest, the tax rate limits are very e¤ective in reducing the cor-
ruption. But in our model abilities of candidates may di¤er, leading di¤erent
policy platforms independent of corruption. If that is the case, then the equi-
librium may involve the corrupt candidate proposing lower taxes. Then any
constitutional constraint on tax rates may reduce voterswelfare. To convey
the intuition, let us provide an example. Consider a world with quasilinear
preferences U = (1  t)Yi + 2pg and one voter Yi = 1. The other parameters
of the model are 1 = 0:34; 2 = 0:30;  = 0:06;  = 12; 1 = 2 = 0:6,
p = 0, w = 0,  = 0:021. In the equilibrium, Candidate 1 proposes a tax rate
of 34 percent, and Candidate 2 proposes 311
3
percent taxes with g1 = (0:34)2;
and g2 = (0:30)2. In the equilibrium, only the popular candidate, Candidate
2, steals. He steals 11
3
percent of total income, and wins the election with a
probability of 0.58. Had he stay honest he would win the election with a prob-
ability of 0.74. Now, let us consider the e¤ects of imposing tax rate constraints
starting from a constraint at 34 percent. A constraint just below 34 percent
will bind only for the honest candidate. One can show algebraically that it will
increase both the probability that Candidate 2 wins the election, 2, and the
amount he steals s2. The result is intuitive as we are tying the hands of clean
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candidate (he can not o¤er the optimal platform anymore), the corrupt ones
popularity advantage becomes more important. When T = 31:36 the limit
will be just binding for both candidates. From that point on s2 will decrease.
At T = 30:03 percent, candidate 2 is stealing again 11
3
percent of total income
as before, but, now the probability of him winning the election has increased
two percent, to 0.600951. At T = 30:03 voterswelfare is lower compared to
no limits case, as we are forcing the e¢ cient candidate, Candidate 2, to pro-
duce the public good using less than optimal public funds. As we lower the
constraint further, the welfare will decrease even more.3
3.2 Incentives to Politicians
3.2.1 Small Changes in Penalties
It is clear that with a su¢ ciently strong legal enforcement, the problem of
corruption can be eradicated. For example whenever pv > 1; the expected
gain from corruption is denitely negative since in that case, j   pv < 0 for
any j: Thus when the legal incentives are high enough, no one will steal no
matter what the electoral incentives are. Although e¤ective, such strong legal
incentives are not always feasible due to administrative and legal constraints.
Increasing p is not easy. In Philippines, where two past presidents, Ferdinand
Marcos and Joseph Estrada, are believed to embezzle 5 to 10 billion and 78
3The analytical solutions to the example is quite tedious. A Mathematica notebook with
calculations is available from the author.
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to 80 million US dollars (respectively), Eufemio Domingo, the head of the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, said that We have
all the laws, rules and regulations and especially the institutions not only
to curb, but also to eliminate corruption. The problem is that these laws,
rules and regulations are not being faithfully implemented....Big time grafters
.... are elected and reelected to government o¢ ces.Balgos, (1998, p.267-
268), quoted in Quah (1999). In countries with a signicant level of political
corruption, p may not be zero, but denitely it is small. Given the weak
auditing, one solution is to have a very high punishment when the o¤ender
is caught. It makes law enforcement e¤ective, despite the low probability of
detection. That quick x, we think, is not feasible either. In many countries
with widespread political corruption, the legal system itself is not very accurate
and is subject to inuence by the executive branch. To allow one politician
to be severely punished may deter not only corruption but also opposition.
So we assume that the system has a weak auditing mechanism and signicant
increases in penalties are not feasible. The following proposition considers the
e¤ect of small increases in penalties on corruption.
There is always pressure on politicians from the public and nowadays from
multinational organizations for harsher penalties on corruption. Suppose that
small increases in penalties are not costly for the voters. Then,
Proposition 4 A small increase in
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(i) constant penalty, c; always leads to an increase in political corruption,
(ii) variable penalty, v; reduces corruption only when the expected constant
penalty is less than the expected legal rents for a corrupt candidate, pc < (1 
p)(w + ):
Proof. By applying the implicit function theorem on (6) = 0.
The intuition for (i) is that an increase in c actually reduces the expected
rents from o¢ ce and hence reduces the weight politician puts on voter welfare.
Then, the marginal utility of stealing is higher for candidate j; so sj is higher
in the equilibrium. We have the same e¤ect for variable penalty, v, as well.
But for the variable penalty there is another e¤ect that works in the opposite
direction, the higher the v, the lower is j   pv, i.e., the expected penalty
per dollar stolen increases. As the previous ones, that result too depends on
the change in the relative weights discussed in (6). If the rents not varying
with corruption are positive, (1   p)(w + )   pc > 0, then, as v increases,
the relative weight on voters disutility from corruption increases, and the
second e¤ect dominates. Thus the equilibrium level of sj will be lower. So,
the constant penalty is good only if it is high enough to completely deter
corruption. Note that the condition for the e¤ectiveness of a variable penalty
will be more di¢ cult to hold when the constant penalty is higher. Thus, in
our model, the constant penalty can be justied only when it is su¢ ciently
high.
23
3.2.2 Wage reform
As Persson and Tabellini (2000) observed in their discussion of Polo (1998),
higher ego rents imply lower political corruption. Similar to ego rents, higher
wages also makes winning the election more attractive, and reduces the amount
each agent steals. The advantage of increasing wages over increasing ego rents
is that it is easier to increase the monetary compensation than rents based
on psychological factors. After Becker and Stigler (1974), e¢ ciency wages
are proposed by many authors in the literature as a solution to bureaucratic
corruption. For instance Wittman (1995) in his analysis of electoral-market
competition and the control of opportunistic behavior says that ...oppor-
tunism by politicians is mitigated when they are paid above-market salaries
and then threatened with losing the o¢ ce if they shirk. p. 27On the other
hand, wage increases, unlike the increases in ego rents,should be nanced
from the public budget. Since, a clean government may have a high cost in
terms of high wages paid to the political agents, one should calculate not only
the e¤ect of wages on corruption, but also the net e¤ect, including the e¤ect
of wages on taxes and on public good levels. As derived in Appendix, the total
e¤ect of an innitesimal increase in wage, w; on (expected) voter welfare is
dE[W]
dw
=  
X
j2f1;2g
jj
dE[Ui(:)]
dg
(1 +
dsj(w)
dw
): (7)
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That implies, if we increase the wage candidate j receives, this will increase
voter welfare only when the benet of high wages (a decrease in sj and hence
an increase in gj) is larger than the cost of high wages (an increase in taxes),
i.e., only when
dsj (w)
dw
<  1. Also note that the net benet from one candidate
a¤ects voterswelfare proportional to the likelihood of that candidate winning
the election. The next proposition, proved in the Appendix, characterizes
conditions under which wage increases are welfare increasing given that both
candidates are corrupt.
Proposition 5 If both candidates steal in the equilibrium, then for a small in-
crease in wages to be welfare-increasing, a necessary condition is minf1; 2g 
pv < 1  p, while a su¢ cient condition is maxf1; 2g   pv < 1  p:
When they work, both higher v and higher w reduce equilibrium corruption
in two channels. There is a direct e¤ect increasing the relative weight on
votersdisutility on (6). For instance the higher wages increase the rents from
the o¢ ce and hence the weight the candidate puts on voter welfare goes up,
inducing lower corruption. The strategic e¤ect, on the other hand, works
on the last part of (6): a rival candidate also reduces his corruption, j is now
lower, which further reduces the incentives to steal. Obviously the strategic
e¤ect occurs only when the rival candidate is also corrupt. Also, when one
candidate is honest, he will be paid the higher salary, although he would not
steal without it. Lemma 2 in Appendix provides the condition for
dsj (w)
dw
<  1,
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when only one candidate is corrupt.
4 Political Economy of the Reform
In section 3, we studied the conditions under which each reform is welfare
increasing. In this section we argue that even when constitutional constraints
or salary reform are welfare-increasing, they may not be implemented. Note
that we do not consider the problems with the implementation of e¤ective
legal enforcement here. Unlike the other three reforms, e¤ective legal enforce-
ment requires e¤ective institutions not just passing some laws. Since we have
not explicitly modelled the working of these institutions, we can not discuss
the possible problems with improving them within our model. For the other
reforms, the asymmetric information, and rigidity of constitutions may re-
duce the e¤ectiveness of the reform; the redistributive e¤ects of the reform
may reduce voterssupport for e¤ective reforms; and, both corrupt and honest
politiciansmay not support the reform.
Using regulation analogy; a fully informed and benevolent regulator can
implement the rstbest by simply assigning the quality and quantity levels
for each duopolist. Yet, if either the quality of information or the incentives
of the regulator are not as assumed, the regulation is not necessarily welfare-
increasing. An important di¤erence between regulation and the reforms we
study is that these rules, for instance constitutions, last longer than a specic
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regulatory rule. So, to design e¤ective rules, information about both the cur-
rent and future parameters of the model is needed. The information about the
candidate abilities and the voter incomes is required to determine the rst
best policy platforms for each candidate for each period. In general one also
needs to know the level of honesty and popularity of each candidate to design
the most e¤ective reform. More importantly, since these rules will apply for
many periods, any variation in future parameters reduce the potential e¤ec-
tiveness of the reform, even when the designers of the reform have perfect
information about the parameters. That is because, whenever the world is
not static, the reform should be designed for the average types. Then, the
limits, for instance, will be too tight when the candidates are better, and too
loose when the candidates are worse, than the average. A quote from Hume
in Brennan and Buchanan (1980), in contriving any system of government,
and xing the several checks and controls of constitution, every man ought to
be suppose a knave, and to have no other end, in his all actions, than private
interestmakes us think that the optimal rules should be designed under
the assumption that all politicians are totally corrupt, not because they will
be, but if we are protected from the worst then we are protected from all.4
This idea would be correct only when such restrictions are costless.
4One of the authors, Geo¤rey Brennan in a recent book, Brennan and Hamlin (2000),
notes the importance of economising on virtue where he describes his new position as
this marks a sharp departure from earlier writing... where the assumption of self-interested
motivation is defended in the constitutional context.
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It is clear that typically voters will not have access to the detailed informa-
tion that we mentioned above. Yet, it is quite possible that, on these issues,
some members of the society, maybe honest politicians, judges, activists, jour-
nalists, or even academics, are better informed. Can an uninformed voter,
then, delegate the task of designing the reform to another voter? The answer
is not in the a¢ rmative. Each reform has redistributive e¤ects, and there is
a conict of interest among voters with di¤erent incomes on the denition of
the optimal reform. For instance, consider the e¤ect of tax rate limits on the
welfare of di¤erent voters when candidates are identical. The change in voters
welfare due to an innitesimal decrease in tax rate limit, is equal to
E[YiI
0((1  T )Yi)] H 0(g(T ))(1  ds

dT
): (8)
The rst term measures the (average) benet due to lower taxes, i.e., higher
private good consumption, and the second termmeasures the cost, lower public
good consumption. On the other hand, the e¤ect of a tax rate limit on the
welfare of voter i is
YiI
0((1  T )Yi) H 0(g(T ))(1  ds

dT
). (9)
Comparing (8) and (9), note that the cost is unchanged, as everyone consumes
the same amount of public good, but the benet for every citizen depends on
28
his income. And since we assume that the most preferred tax rate decreases
in income, cI 00(c) + I 0(c) > 0, a voters benet is increasing in his income,
d(YiI
0((1 T )Yi))
dYi
> 0. Intuitively the higher the income of the citizen, the larger
is his benet, the reduction in his tax burden, due to lower taxes. Similarly,
one can show that for both minimum public good limits and the salary reform,
the cost of the reform (higher taxes), is increasing in income, while its benet,
(higher public good consumption), is constant. This time everyone pays the
cost, higher taxes. Since taxes are proportional to income, the rich pay a
proportionally higher fraction of the cost. The benet from the reform, higher
public good level, is distributed equally. This conict of interest among voters
when combined with the voterslack of information makes it especially di¢ cult
to convince an uninformed (supra)majority that a given reform will increase
their current and future welfare. The fact that elections do not give enough
incentives to agents to maximize aggregate welfare does not necessarily mean
that if some members of society design a reform, it will give the right incentives.
The voterssupport, although is necessary, may not be su¢ cient for the
reform to be implemented. We have political corruption to begin with exactly
because there is an agency problem: a policy that the electorate appreciates,
clean government, is not being implemented. In our setup, if all candidates
agree not to propose the reform, it will never be implemented and the cor-
ruption among the political leaders will continue. An interesting question,
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then, is whether the politicians will support the reform. A utility-maximizing
politician should compare the benets and costs of the reform for himself.
Adding the reform to policy platform would increase his vote shares in current
elections, yet curbing corruption might reduce his current and future payo¤s.
Since this problem is also a dynamic one and our model is static, we discuss
it only informally here.5
Let us rst consider the candidatessupport for constitutional constraints.
When both candidates are corrupt it is not di¢ cult to see that if the illegal
rents from the corrupt status quo are signicantly high, then each of the (cor-
rupt) candidates would rationally choose not to propose the reform, because
then even if the candidate who propose the reform wins the election for sure,
his expected rents decreases. One may be inclined to think that this corrup-
tion trap is possible only when all the politicians are corrupt. Since an honest
politician does not steal, he will incur no cost by supporting the reform. This
reasoning is, however, not always correct. Consider an honest leader, Candi-
date 1, who is going to compete with a corrupt rival in the next election. A
successful reform that will prevent all future corruption will a¤ect the policy
platform of Candidate 2 in future elections. It will induce Candidate 2 to o¤er
a more voter friendly platform. This will reduce the honest candidates vote
share. So, the honest candidate may also not propose the reform. The reason
5We discuss politicianssupport for the reform in a simpler setting with three candidates
in Evrenk(2004).
30
is that political competition is a zero sum game without corruption, but not
with corruption. The existence of corruption benets both candidates, even
when one of the candidates is completely honest. When one candidate is cor-
rupt, he is better o¤, since he can get the illegal rents. The (honest) competitor
is better o¤ because by stealing the candidate makes his policy platform less
attractive and hence the policy platform of his rival becomes more attractive.
When the choice to be corrupt is no longer available, the corrupt candidate is
going to lose his rents, but the honest one will lose some of his voters.
The salary reform, on the other hand is di¤erent, since then the salaries of
both candidates increases. It might even be the case that both voters and the
candidates support the salary reform. Yet, still there is a conict of interest as
then the candidates could ask for salaries higher than the welfare maximizing
level. One can formally show that, if a wage increase is also welfare increasing,
and the candidates are allowed to propose their wages as part of their policy
platform (with t; and g)then, in the equilibrium, (i) they will not steal, and
(ii) for c small enough, voterswelfare will decrease.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we studied the e¤ectiveness of constitutional constraints and
the salary reform in reducing the political corruption and increasing the vot-
erswelfare. In a static model we analyzed the e¤ects of each reform using
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a model of political competition between two candidates under probabilistic
voting. We discussed other di¢ culties that reformers would face, such as in-
formational problems and the conict of interest among voters, in a dynamic
setup. We also argued that politicians themselves, honest and corrupt, may
oppose anti-corruption reforms. We are planning to extend our analysis in
following directions: (i) campaign nancing, (ii) candidates with ideological
motivations, and (iii) Principal-Agent analysis when the agent has some au-
thority over the principle.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. For s(G) > 0, one can calculate that,
ds
dG
= 1

Rp(s(G))E[Y 2i I
00(1  1

G s(G) w)]
Rp(s(G))E[Y 2i I00(1  1G s(G) w)] ( pv)E[YiI0(1  1G s(G) w)]
.
When H(:) is strictly concave,   1

< ds

dG
< 0. The total e¤ect of pub-
lic good limits on voterswelfare, @E[W]
@G
, is equal to H 0(G)   E[YiI 0((1  
t)Yi)](
1

+ ds

dG
). Note that at unregulated political equilibrium, (t; g), we
have H 0(g) = E[YiI 0((1  t)Yi)] Thus at G = g, we have @E[W]@G > 0.
Lemma 1 dE[W]
dw
=  Pj2f1;2g jj dE[Ui(:)]dg (1 + dsj (w)dw )
Proof. The derivative of E[W] with respect to w is
dE[Ui((1 t2(w))Yi;g2(w))]
dw
+ 1(
dE[Ui((1 t1(w))Yi;g1(w))]
dw
  dE[Ui((1 t2(w))Yi;g2(w))]
dw
)
= ((1  1)dE[Ui((1 t2(w))Yi;g2(w))]dw + 1 dE[Ui((1 t1(w))Yi;g1(w))]dw ):
32
Note that, dE[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
dw
is equal to
@E[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
@tj
dtj(w)
dw
+
@E[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
@sj
dsj (w)
dw
+
@E[Ui((1 tj)Yi;j(tj w sj))]
@w
:
By the f.o.c for the tax rate the rst term is zero, so we have
dE[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
dw
=
@E[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
@sj
dsj (w)
dw
+
@E[Ui((1 tj)Yi;j(tj w sj))]
@w
:
As a last step note that,
@E[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
@sj
=
@E[Ui((1 tj)Yi;j(tj w sj))]
@w
=  j @E[Ui(c
j
i ;gj)]
@g
:
Thus, dE[Ui((1 tj(w))Yi;gj(w))]
dw
=  j @E[Ui(c
j
i ;gj)]
@g
(1 +
dsj (w)
dw
); and
dE[W]
dw
=  Pj2f1;2g jj dE[Ui(:)]dg (1 + dsj (w)dw ):
Proof of Proposition 4. Taking the derivative of rst order conditions and
noting that the derivative of @E[Ui((1 tj)Yi;j(tj W sj))]
@tj
with respect sj is equal
to the derivative with respect to wage, w; we have the following equation,2664
@2(1R

1)
(@s1)2
@2(1R

1)
@s1@s2
@2(2R

2)
@s1@s2
@2(2R

2)
(@s2)2
3775
2664
ds1
dw
ds2
dw
3775 =
2664  
@2(1R

1)
@s1@w
 @2(2R2)
@s2@w
3775. The solution is

dsj
dw

=
24 @2(jRj )@sj@sk @2(kRk)@sk@w   @2(kRk)(@sk)2 @2(jRj )@sj@w
@2(1R

1)
(@s1)2
@2(2R

2)
(@s2)2
  @2(1R1)
@s1@s2
@2(2R

2)
@s1@s2
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By Corollary 1 from Evrenk (2006), D =
@2(jR

j )
(@sj )2
@2(kR

k)
(@sk)2
  @2(jRj )
@sj@s

k
@2(kR

k)
@sk@s

j
< 0.
Thus
dsj
dw
<  1 i¤ @
2(jR

j )
@sj@sk
@2(kR

k)
@sk@w
  @
2(kR

k)
(@sk)2
@2(jR

j )
@sj@w
>  D. (10)
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An increase in legal and illegal rents have same e¤ect on equilibrium policies,
@tj
@sj
=
@tj
@w
; thus
dgj
dsj
=
dgj
dw
: Using this,
@2(jR

j )
@sj@w
=
@2(kR

k)
(@sk)2
+
@2(jR

j )
@sj@sk
  Aj;
where Aj = j[1  p  j + pv]H 0(gj ). Using this in (10) gives us
dsj
dw
<  1 i¤ @
2(jR

j )
@sj@sk
Ak   @
2(kR

k)
(@sk)2
Aj > 0.
By Lemma 3 from Evrenk (2006),
@2(jR

j )
@sj@sk
> 0 and @
2(kR

k)
(@sk)2
< 0: Thus minfAk;
Ajg > 0 is necessary and maxfAk; Ajg > 0 is su¢ cient for ds

j
dw
<  1.
Lemma 2 When only candidate j steals in the equilibrium, we have
dsj
dw
<  1 i¤ j   pv < 1 p
[1+
kH
0(g0
k
)
jH
0(g
j
)
]
:
Proof. When only candidate j steals dsj
dw
=
  @
2(jRj )
@sj@w
@2(
j
R
j
)
(@sj)
2
; which implies
dsj
dw
<  1 i¤ j
k
1 p+j pv
j pv <
@E[Ui(t
o
k;g
o
k)]
@g
@E[Ui(t

j
;g
j
)]
@g
:Rearranging the terms, we obtain
the condition above.
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